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27th MT Bn
65/66

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS
27TH TRANSPORTATION BATTALION (TRUCK)
APO US Forces 96238

AVLC-QUI-27TC-CO

6 January 1966

SUBJECT: Command Report For Quarterly Period Ending 31 December 1965 (RCS CSGPO-28 (R1))

SECTION I

Significant Organizational Activities

1. 27th Transportation Battalion (TRUCK), consisting of the Headquarters Detachment only, departed Oakland, California, on the USNS E. D. Patrick (METS), on 1 October 1965. Enroute the detachment served as Voyage Staff for the 2200 embarked troops (Army and USMC).

2. The unit arrived in Qui Nhon on 22 October, landing on 24 October. Informally it assumed command and control immediately of seven transportation truck units (particulars of which are contained in Annex A). Six of these units had been under control of 394th Transportation Battalion (Terminal Service) and had just completed Operation Highland, the receipt and movement of the 1st Air Cavalry Division to An Khe. The seventh unit arrived at the same time, on another vessel, as did this headquarters. Formal attachment (see details outlined in Annex B) of all units was completed by 28 October, as follows:

a. Seven units were attached to this headquarters; six were under complete control, and one under operational control (and later brought under administrative control).

b. The battalion, as an organization, was attached to 4th Transportation Command for command and operational control, and to (now) US Army Support Command (Provisional), Qui Nhon for administration and logistical support. (NOTE: Both 4th Transportation Command, in Saigon, and USASC, QN, in Qui Nhon, are 1st Logistical Command elements.)

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3. During the remaining two months of the quarter, the battalion was involved in the following general missions, in order of priority, as established by Letter of Instructions, Headquarters, 4th Transportation Command (Terminal A), dated 19 October 1965:

a. Port and beach clearance.

b. Local and line haul movement of personnel and supplies as directed (i.e., by local area commander, with concurrence of Commanding Officer, 4th Transportation Command).

c. Provide for physical security of personnel, equipment, facilities, and billets of 4th Transportation Command elements.

(NOTE: Specific operations actually conducted, and significant statistics and problems are discussed fully in paragraph 4a, below.)

4. The following significant events and/or problems, arranged by staff functional area, have occurred or are still occurring:

a. Operations:

(1) Significant Events:

(a) Operation Highland: Truck units of this Battalion hauled a total of 57,594 short tons of cargo for a total of 609,552 miles during Operation Highland. Operation Highland, the landing of the 1st Cavalry Division, brought 16,000 troops, 477 aircraft and 38 million pounds of cargo over the Qui Nhon Beach for movement to An Khe in a two week period. Units participating were: the 2d, 58th, 61st, 541st, and 597th Transportation Companies.

(b) Operation Goodfriend: During the period 16 October 1965 through 30 November 1965, 572 trucks of the 27th Battalion moved the Republic of Korea (CAPITOL) Division into field positions in the Qui Nhon Areas. In supporting Operation Goodfriend, 6,697 passengers and 6,943 short tons of cargo were transported.

(c) Monsoon Express Operation: In October, the first, big line haul truck convoy from the Battalion rolled to Pleiku from Qui Nhon over Highway 19 during an eight day line haul operation, hauling all classes of supplies and POL to tactical combat units. Subsequently, 13

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truck convoys have traveled to Pleiku. From the period 20 November 1965 to 31 December 1965, a total of 6,498 short tons of cargo and 1,005,000 gallons of POL was delivered to Pleiku by 456 task trucks. Additionally, several convoys delivered needed ammunition and supplies to Kontum, North of Pleiku. For hauling 40 trailerloads of Vietnamese cargo to Pleiku, during a three day line haul operation, the 27th Transportation Battalion won a citation from the Commanding Officer, Vietnamese II Area Logistic Command, in November 1965. The Vietnamese Transportation Corps Insignia was awarded to 10 members of the Battalion as a symbol of friendship and cooperation between Vietnamese and US Army Transportation Units.

(d) Operation Bluelight and Matador: Inasmuch as these operational missions are still in effect, details will be submitted in later command reports, when completed.

(e) Unit Moves: Truck transportation was furnished to many units entering Vietnam. This organization supported Operation Bald-Eagle which was the redeployment of the 101st Airborne Division from Qui Nhon, and occurred in November 1965.

(f) Red Ball Express: In December 1965, this Headquarters provided transportation for Red Ball Express, a Department of the Army project designed for expeditious movement of critical repair parts on an immediate priority basis. A total of 10,207 lbs of Red Ball Express cargo was transported by units of this Battalion from 8th Aerial Port, Qui Nhon, to repair parts activities for the period ending 31 December 1965.

(g) General Performance Report: The following passengers and tonnages were transported by this command from the period 28 October to 26 December 1965:

a Port/Beach Clearance: 51,637 Short Tons, and 28,415 Passengers.

b Local Haul: 37,029 Short Tons of General Cargo, 69,133 Passengers, and 2,534 Short Tons of POL products.

c Line Haul: 37,275 Short Tons of General Cargo, 17,019 passengers, and 6,898 Short Tons of POL products.

d Total Mileages: An aggregate total of 2,093,441 miles were traveled by all seven (7) truck units of this Battalion since arrival in Vietnam.

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(2) Problems:

(a) The lack of additional "B" trailers for our three medium truck companies severely limits the units ability to operate at maximum capability. A total of 180 additional trailers were requisitioned for line haul and transfer operations in September 1965; however, only 20 additional trailers have been received as of this date. (NOTE: The overseas commander was queried on "B" packs for units departing Fort Eustis, since they were WABTOC Items. The reply was to leave these behind.)

(b) Repeated delays in unloading vehicles and trailers at the Qui Nhon Depot, An Khe and Pleiku areas have resulted in increased turnaround and reduced carrying capability. Delays were caused by shortage of MHE and personnel for unloading.

b. Administration:

(1) Upon arrival, as a result largely of the rapid build-up of US Forces, administrative references from all higher headquarters were not available and the hap-hazard system of providing them has still not enabled this headquarters to build a proper reference library.

(2) Blank forms were not and are still not available, forcing units and this (and higher) headquarters to stretch regulations concerning forms control. Under the present requisitioning system (i.e., from Okinawa) the first requisition has yet to be filled.

(3) The Pinpoint Distribution System (which covers, unfortunately, only DA publications) is extremely effective.

(4) It has proven difficult to separate command and operational control from administrative control; however, by local trial and error, this problem is slowly clearing itself up. The problem area lies in the close association of administration (reports and allied matters) pertaining to operations.

(5) Personnel inputs to off-set personnel losses is still an unknown and, during the last quarter was not an insurmountable problem for other reasons (e.g., deadline for lack of logistical support). However, as of the close of the quarter, no improvement is in sight and the outlook is bleak. While based on a non-positive premise, this headquarters has reason to believe that some units were deployed without reporting projected losses upon departure (i.e., this headquarters did accomplish this for all its units from Fort Eustis, and replacements are coming in on these units; how-

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no reports of inputs have been received on units obtained from other origins and it is not known if such projected loss reports were made on them prior to departure). (See Annex C.)

(6) One unit (444th Trans Co) was sent here overstrength by MOS and grade to the point that it has created a serious morale problem, as follows:

(a) Within the unit there is no hope for promotion allocations until this overage is reduced (and this is being accomplished by transferring these men, 64B20 E-5s, to medium units as vacancies occur).

(b) The transfer of 64B20 E-5s from 444th Trans Co into units authorized them has cut and will continue to cut promotion potential in these units receiving these men.

(7) Office supplies, especially expendable items such as mimeograph paper and ink, lined tablets, are difficult to obtain. Envelopes, which are not the self-seal type, are unserviceable due to the weather, becoming stuck before use.

(8) Mail receipt, in spite of all the arguments presented for the reasons, still is a moral problem; personnel are generally unhappy about the undue delays. Virtually no improvement has been noted by any units since their arrival. Delivery varies from four days (at best) to eight.

c. Logistics:

(1) US Army Support Command (Provisional), Qui Nhon, has been the supporting activity of this unit since 24 October 1965. Its support is rendered on the following priority:

(a) Special Forces.

(b) Military Advisory Command, Vietnam.

(c) Combat Forces (US, Republic of Korea, and Army Republic of Vietnam).

(d) Combat Support Forces.

(e) Combat Service Support Forces.

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(2) Due to the low priority of this organization and its units (i.e., "e" above) requisitions have remained unfilled, most job orders have not been accomplished, expendable supplies have been difficult to acquire, no organizational clothing system has been organized, repair facilities for boots, typewriters, and canvas have been most inadequate to satisfy the needs of this unit, and acquisition of PX supplies (i.e., soft drinks and beer) have been at a minimum.

(3) Allowing for the low priority this entire support area has (i.e., US Army Support Command, Cui Nhon (Provisional), Cui Nhon is composed mostly of combat support and combat service support units), it is still difficult to understand why such items as combat boots, fatigues, refrigerators, and power sources cannot be received through normal supply channels. These situations exist because, in spite of being a Category II organization composed of Category II units, our priority is the lowest in this area (i.e., while some are as low, none are lower).

d. Maintenance:

(1) Low engineering construction priority has hampered organizational maintenance facilities such as grease racks, wash points, shop space for generators, and battery repairs. However, the critical problems resulting from the wash rack has temporarily been resolved by a local inadequate field expedient.

(2) Fire fighting facilities are still very limited. There is no refilling capability available in this area for repair of the foam type fire extinguishers. These extinguishers are normally used on most tactical vehicles and in motor pool areas.

(3) Unusual heavy workload of cargo transport had rendered sideboards of 12 Ton Stake and Platform trailers unserviceable. Response to the repair requirements by Support Maintenance has not to date been adequate to keep up with the rapid deterioration of this equipment. Efforts are now underway to speed up the response thru local procurement of materials for rebuild and repair.

(4) A 15 day level Prescribed Load List did not prove adequate for support units in this theater of operation, causing excessive deadline of equipment.

(5) Battalion Headquarters elements should arrive in country with the advance party or prior to arrival of TOE attached units for proper preliminary orientation and utilization of arriving units.

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(6) Operations have been hampered by short resupply of the following items; urgent follow-up action has met with little success:

(a) Steering Relay Bracket for 5 Ton Tractors M52 & M52A2.

(b) Clutches for M52, M52A2, & M35A2.

(c) Radiators for M52 & M35A2.

(d) C.V. Boots for M52 & M52A2.

(e) Hand Brake Shoes for M52 & M52A2.

(f) Engines for M52, M52A2, and M35A2.

(g) Fuel Injector Pumps for M52A2 & M35A2.

(h) Fuel Filters for M52A2 & M35A2.

(7) Shortage of tires, tubes, and tube repair items was initially experienced. However, this problem is being resolved by improved supply stockage of these items.

SECTION II

Commander's Recommendations

1. It is recommended that future deployment of truck units be made with WABTOC trailers (i.e., "B" pack).

2. It is recommended that greater care be taken in insuring that projected losses of personnel are reported into the personnel "pipeline" prior to deployment and, further, that a method of verification of the requisitions be made available to the local overseas commander.

3. It is recommended that consideration be given to clarifying doctrinal definitions of administration, operations, and logistics to enable easier understanding of responsibility channels when units and/or organizations are attached to one headquarters for some functions and other headquarters for other functions.

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4. It is recommended that Prescribed Load List of deployed units be more than 15 days level of supply, based on the parts situation in the area of assignment and the fact that stateside Prescribed Load Lists are based on peacetime demand data and are insufficient for a similar period in a Combat Zone.

5. It is recommended that headquarters elements be deployed before operational units to provide necessary guidance and proper utilization of these units, facilitating later arrivals to a more rapid operational condition.

6. Although it is clearly understood that a system of priorities must be established for many controlled items to preserve the necessities for the most critical personnel and areas, strongly recommend that some latitude be exercised to provide the basic necessities for existence to lower priority units (i.e., clothing, tentage, generators and refrigerators).

3 Annexes:
A - Assigned/Attached Units
B - Attachment History and Authority
C - Personnel Gains and Losses

HENRY W. COCDELL
Lt Col, TC
Commanding

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Annex A to Quarterly Command Report For Period Ending 31 Dec 65, 27th Transportation Battalion (TRUCK).

ASSIGNED/ATTACHED UNITS

UNIT/ORIGIN	TOE	DATE ARRIVED ON	CO
HHD Ft Eustis, Va.	55-16F	22 Oct 65	Capt K. M. Pitman
2d Trans Co (MTrk) (Comp) Ft Ord, Calif.	55-18F	31 Aug 65	1st R. KTF Luke
58th Trans Co (LTrk) Ft Leonard Wood, Mo.	55-17F	27 Aug 65	Capt J. J. Roscelli *
61st Trans Co (MTrk) (Petrl) Ft Eustis, Va.	55-18F	31 Aug 65	Capt C. M. Katz
151st Trans Co (LTrk) Ft Campbell, Ky.	55-17F	2 Sep 65	Capt J. F. Hall
444th Trans Co (LTrk) Ft Riley, Kansas	55-17F	26 Oct 65	Capt J. M. Turley
541st Trans Co (LTrk) Ft Bragg, N.C.	55-17F	2 Sep 65	Capt W. A. Bryans
597th Trans Co (MTrk) Ft Eustis, Va.	55-18F	15 Jul 65	Capt R. Bodziony

* Assumed command on 18 Nov 65

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Annex B to Quarterly Command Report for Period Ending 31 Dec 65, 27th Transportation Battalion (TRUC).

ATTACHMENT REPORT AND AUTHORITY

1. 27th Transportation Battalion was attached to 4th Transportation Command (Terminal A), effective 27 Oct 65 by authority of General Order 69, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, dated 28 Nov 65.

2. This same general order directed Cai Nhon Support Area (now US Army Support Command (Provisional), Qui Nhon) to supervise administration and provide logistical support to the battalion.

3. The units shown below were attached to 27th Transportation Battalion by authority of General Order 65, Headquarters, 4th Transportation Command, dated 27 Oct 65:

a. 58th Trans Co (LTrk)

b. 151st Trans Co (LTrk)

c. 541st Trans Co (LTrk)

d. 597th Trans Co (MTrk)

e. 2d Trans Co (MTrk) (Comb)

f. 67th Trans Co (MTrk) (Petrl)

4. The 444th Trans Co (LTrk) was attached to 27th Transportation Battalion by authority of General Order 66, Headquarters, 4th Transportation Command, dated 28 Oct 65.