

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

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| 1. LOCATION 729th TC LSA Anaconda, Iraq APO AE 09391 | 2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2005/10/28 | 3. TIME 1330 | 4. FILE NUMBER |
| 5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME SOUZA, JOHN, PHILLIP | 6. SSN [REDACTED] | 7. GRADE/STATUS E-8/MSG | |
| 8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS 729TH TC, LSA ANACONDA, IRAQ APO AE 09391 | | | |

9. I, JOHN PHILLIP SOUZA, WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

ON 26 OCT 2005 THE 729TH TC AND 1173RD WERE TASKED WITH A MISSION TRANSPORTING MULTI CLASS SUPPLIES FOR THE 82ND AIRBORNE AT FT SUSE . THE 729TH LINKED UP AT THE 1173RD MP AT 0730 FOR CONVOY REHEARSAL AND BRIEF. TOPICS COVERED WERE ROLL OVER DRILL, SNATCH AND GRAB, 9-LINE MEDEVAC AND LZ. DEPARTED MP TO NECP FOR SP OF 0920. MY VEHICLE EQUIPPED WITH MTS 9038 WAS BEING MANNED BY SPC TURNER TO RELAY SP, CP AND ANY OTHER CLP INFO TO 729TH TOC. I FURTHER TOLD HER SPC TURNER SHE TO RELY ON THE SPREAD SHEET SUPPLIED WITH ALL THE GRIDS FOR CP'S AND OTHER INFORMATION AND PLUGGER WOULD HAVE TO BE USED. THIS WAS ONLY MY SECOND TIME TRAVELING THIS ROUTE AND (FIRST TIME WAS TO FOB BERNSTEIN) THAT I WAS UNFAMILIAR WITH ALL THE CP'S. CLP TRAVELED DOWN ASR DOVER ENROUTE TO MSR CHEYENNE WITH NO INCIDENTS OTHER THAN THE VERY POOR ROAD CONDITIONS. AS WE TURNED ONTO CHEYENNE TO HEAD NORTH, ALL GUN TRUCKS WERE CALLING THEIR MARKS. AS WE NEARED FOB ASHRAF THERE WAS A SMALL CONVOY OUTBOUND WITH 4 VEHICLES HEADING SOUTH ON CHEYENNE. SHORTLY AFTER WE PASSED FOB ASHRAF THE CLP CAME TO A HALT SO DRIVERS COULD CHECK LOADS AND TIGHTEN ANY STRAPS THAT CAME LOOSE ROUGHLY AROUND 1040 HRS. THE STOP LASTED LESS THAN 10 MINUTES. WE CONTINUED TO TRAVEL NORTH TOWARDS FOB WARRIOR WHERE WE WOULD LINK UP WITH ESCORT ELEMENT TO FT SUSE. ON THE EAST SIDE OF MSR CHEYENNE WAS A GAS STATION THAT HAD A VERY HIGH VOLUME OF CIVILIAN VEHICLES WAITING TO FUEL, AT THIS POINT ALL SEEMED FINE. WE CONTINUED TRAVELING NORTH AND CAME UPON A MULTI VEHICLE ACCIDENT INVOLVING ROLLED OVER TRUCKS AND LOADS OF APPLES LITTERING THE MSR. GT 1 CALLED AND STATED WE WERE GOING HAJI, WE MADE THE DETOUR WITH NO ISSUES. CONTINUING TRAVEL NORTH ON MSR CHEYENNE I ASKED SPC TURNER IF SHE WAS BEING SUCCESSFUL WITH MTS MESSAGES TO 729TH TOC, HER REPLY WAS YES. I RECALL TELLING HER THAT THE MSR APPEARED TO HAVE MORE IED HOLES AND BURNT VEHICLES THAN I REMEMBERED FROM MY EARLIER MISSION. AS WE TRAVELED THROUGH THE VILLAGE (CP 6). WITHIN MINUTES AFTER WE ROLLED THROUGH THE VILLAGE BETWEEN GT 1, BT AND FOUR M915 SYSTEMS THERE WERE THREE IED DETONATIONS FOLLOWED BY HEAVY VOLUME OF SAF COMING FROM A BURM 30-50 METERS TO THE WEST OF MSR CHEYENNE SAW 3-5 SILHOUETTES FIRING FROM THE BERM BUT COULD GET A CLEAR ID OF WHAT THEY WERE WEARING. HEARD CLICKING AND METALLIC SOUNDS INDICATING WE RECEIVED SOME HITS . THE SPEED AND INTERVAL AT THE TIME OF ATTACK WAS ROUGHLY 50-55 M.P.H. AND INTERVALS 75-100 METERS. IN THE FRONT ALL IEDS WERE DETONATED BETWEEN THE VEHICLE INTERVAL SPACE CAUSING NO APPARENT DAMAGE FROM MY VIEW (FIRST IED DETONATED ON THE RIGHT JUST BEHIND GT 1, SECOND IED DETONATED ON THE LEFT BETWEEN THE BT AND SGT SICCARIOS, THE THIRD IED DETONATED BEHIND SGT SICCARIOS TO THE RIGHT). I TOLD SPC TURNER TO GET A GRID AND MTS TOC WE WERE UNDER ATTACK FROM THREE IEDS WITH SAF. ALL VEHICLES IN FRONT APPEARED TO BE FINE AS ALL SPED UP TO GET OUT OF THE KILL ZONE. THE MSR WAS COVERED WITH DEBRIS AND THICK CLOUDS OF BLACK SMOKE THAT EXTENDED VERY HIGH INTO THE SKY. I LOOKED IN MY MIRROR AND COULD SEE ONE M915 BEHIND ME (1SG HEUER). WE TRAVELED ABOUT 5 MILES UP THE ROAD AND CAME TO A LINEAR HALT. AT THIS TIME THERE WAS GT 1, BT, 3 M915 GT 2 AND 4 M915. WHILE LACE REPORT WAS CONDUCTED, SSG MULCHAY CALLED GT2 BACK TO PULL SECURITY DUE TO FRONT DOOR BEING OPEN. LACE REPORT WAS PASSED BACK TO THE 729TH LCC SSG FRONCAK INFORMING HERE WE SUSTAINED NO INJURIES AND HAD ONE M915 WITH TWO TIRES ON THE LEFT SIDE FORWARD REAR AXLE BLOWN OUT AND A STACK OF LUMBER ON FIRE FROM EITHER A GRENADE OR RPG HIT. ALSO NOTED FROM A QUICK SCAN THAT ALL VEHICLES RECEIVED SAF. WHILE AT THE HALT SOLDIERS OF THE BURNING WOOD, HURRIED TO ESTINGUISH THE FIRE WHILE ASSESSMENT WAS MADE TO CHAIN AND BIND THE LEFT SIDE OF AXLE THINKING WE WOULD BE MOVING

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| 10. EXHIBIT | 11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT <u>LDAD</u> | PAGE 1 OF <u>0</u> PAGES |
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF JOHN PHILLIP SOUZA TAKEN AT LSA ANACONDA DATED 2005/10/28

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

THINKING WE WOULD BE MOVING SOON. AT THE HALT WE HAD TEN VEH AND THIRTY THREE PAX (GT 1, 121 BT, 120 M915, 117 M915, 219 M915, 311 M915, GT 2, 119 M915, 218 M915, 118 M915, 233 M915) SSG MULCHAY CALLED SGT BUMBARNER (GT 2) TO FALL BACK TO REAR SEPARATED ELEMENT DUE TO GT 3 BEING HIT AND HAD INJURIES AND NEEDED FRONT DOOR CLOSED. AT THAT POINT IT WAS REALIZED THERE WAS A MAJOR GAP IN THE CONVOY. WE PROCEEDED TO PULL INTO A BOX FORMATION AND BEGAN FURTHER ASSESSMENTS OF THE ATTACK. SSG STRACKE AND SPC MAGDELANO WERE RAN WITH THEIR M249'S TO CLOSE THE REAR DOOR WHILE GT 1 HAD THE FRONT DOOR CLOSED. THE FIRE WAS ESTINGUISHED BUT WAS STILL SMOLDERING SO CPT PETERSON WAS NOTIFIED THAT THE BEST COURSE OF ACTION WAS TO DUMP THE SMOLDERING WOOD TO AVOID IT STARTING FIRE AGAIN ONCE WE COULD ROLL, HE AGREED. THE DRIVER AND A-DRIVER SPC TOLANO AND SPC VILLA DISCARDED THE WOOD TO THE WEST SIDE OF MSR. I TOLD SPC TURNER TO STAY ON THE MTS WITH COMPANY TOC AND 729TH LCC SSG FRONCAK FOR UPDATES. SPC LANDEROS, SPC YOO, SGT RABORN, SGT SICCAIROS, 1SG HEUER, AND MYSELF STARTED WORKING ON GETTING SPARES TIRES OFF VEHICLES AND REMOVING BLOWN TIRES. DURING THIS TIME ALL REMAINING SOLDIERS WERE ON THE GROUND WEAPON STATUS RED PULLING SECURITY. HAD SPC TURNER GET A STATUS ON PFC TELFORT WHO WAS CPT PETERSON'S CLERK FROM THE 82ND WHO BOTH WERE RIDE ALONGS TO FT SUSE. REPORT CAME BACK HE WAS FINE JUST SHAKEN UP. WHILE CHANGING THE TIRES WE OBSERVED THE MEDEVAC CHOPPERS COME IN AND DEPART. I HAVE NO RECALL OF THE TIME OR HOW LONG THE BIRDS WERE ON THE GROUND. ONCE COMPLETED DUMPING THE WOOD AND SECURING THE TIRES SPC TURNER NOTIFIED SSG FRONCAK WE WERE GREEN. WE BEGAN RECEIVING INFO FROM THE REAR ELEMENT THERE WERE FOUR WIA'S AND ONE KIA AND SEVERAL VEHICLES HAD SUSTAINED DAMAGE THAT WAS STILL BEING ASSESSED. THE DISTANCE BETWEEN THE LEAD ELEMENT TO THE REAR WAS ABOUT ONE TO ONE AND A HALF MILES. JUST TO OUR REAR ON THE SOUTH EAST SIDE THERE WAS A FACTORY OF SOME SORT WITH SMOKE STACKS. THIS WAS ABOUT THE HALFWAY POINT TO ANOTHER REFERENCE POINT OF WHAT APPEARED TO BE AN UNFINISHED OVERPASS THAT WAS THE ESTIMATED LOCATION OF THE REAR ELEMENT. AFTER REALIZING WE HAD SERIOUS ISSUES AT HAD, I TOLD SPC TURNER TO CONTACT 729TH TOC REQUESTING AIR SUPPORT DUE TO LACK OF GUN SUFFICIENT GUN TRUCKS. NO MTS MESSAGES WERE SENT FROM THE FORWARD ELEMENT TO PREVENT CONFUSION, MESSAGING WAS DONE BETWEEN 729TH LCC AND 729TH TOC. MOST IF NOT ALL MESSAGES TO 729TH TOC TIMED OUT. SSG FRONCAK INFORMED BY MTS AND ICOM THAT QRF WAS ENROUTE ALONG WITH RECOVERY ASSESSTS. AGAIN I HAVE NO RECALL TO TIMELINES DUE TO MY IGNORANCE. IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE FORWARD ELEMENT STAY PUT DUE TO THE LACK OF GUN TRUCK SECURITY ISSUES AND THAT QRF WAS ENROUTE. TWO FIGHTER JETS HAD STARTED FLYING OVER THE TWO ELEMENTS FOR ABOUT HALF AN HOUR. THEN TWO KIAWA WARRIOR HELICOPTERS WERE ON SITE PROVIDING CLOSE AIR SUPPORT. GOT WORD QRF WAS DELAYED DUE TO DAISY CHAIN IED BEING FOUND IN THE SAME LOCATION OF OUR ATTACK. THE CHOPPERS AND 729TH LCC WERE COMMUNICATING VIA SINGARS PROVIDING UPDATES TO EACH. WHILE IN THE BOX FORMATION THERE WERE NO EOF FROM ANY 729TH SOLDIERS, BUT GT 1 HAD POSSIBLY ONE OR TWO TO THE FRONT OF THE FORWARD ELEMENT. CIVILIAN TRAFFIC TRAVELED FAR OUT EAST AND WEST OF THE MSR. DURING THE WAITING PERIOD SINCE THE MEDEVAC DEPARTURE AND ARRIVAL OF QRF, THE REAR ELEMENT CONDUCTED RECOVERY AND MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES ON VARIOUS PIECES OF EQUIPMENT DAMAGED FROM ATTACK. QRF ARRIVED THAT WAS CONSISTING OF THREE M1114'S AND ROUGHLY NINE TO TWELVE MARINES. THEN ADDITIONAL QRF ARRIVED WITH SEVERAL MORE SOLDIERS AND M1114'S. GOT WORD THAT THE OIC MAJOR MATTHEWS WANTED TO GET THE ENTIRE CLIP TURNED AROUND AND ROLLING ASAP SO WE COULD CLEAR THE VILLAGE AT CP 6 BEFORE DUSK BECAUSE THE VILLAGE WAS NOT ONE BIT FRIENDLY. ALL FORWARD ELEMENT SOLDIERS MOUNTED UP AND TURNED AROUND JUST OFF TO THE WEST OF MSR WITH QRF PULLING SECURITY. WE NOW WERE LINKED UP WITH THE REAR ELEMENT FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE THE ATTACK AND SAW WEARY BUT HIGH SPIRITED FACES. WE COULD NOT ROLL BACK RIGHT AWAY DUE TO THE VAST NUMBERS OF VEHICLES BLOCKING THE MSR BECAUSE THEY HAVE SAT WAITING TO MOVE THEMSELVES ALL DAY. IT WAS NOTICED THAT GT 5 (HAT) WOULD NEED A FORWARD RIGHT REAR TIRE REPLACED. THIS WAS DONE BY 729TH WRECKER, GT 5 CREW AND MYSELF. THE TRAVEL BACK TO ASHRAF, FOB SPARTAN TOOK ABOUT ONE HOUR. WE DID HAVE TO MAKE A QUICK STOP ONCE WE CLEARED THE VILLAGE TO CORRECT A BRAKE ISSUE ON GT 5. WE WERE ALSO TOLD THAT VBIED WAS FOUND AND THAT THERE WERE SOME WIA AND KIA OF AIF. ONCE THERE WE WERE GREETED BY CPT WATERMAN 1173RD CDR AND LT SMITH 1173RD PLT LDR ALONG WITH INTERNAL/EXTERNAL ASSETS FOR MAINTENANCE, RECOVERY, AND PERSONNEL ISSUES. ALL SUPPORT RENDERED BY THE 793RD MP, KBR RECOVERY, 890TH, AND 1173RD WAS UNBELIEVABLE. HAD IT NOT BEEN FOR THE COURAGE AND SWIFT ACTIONS TAKEN BY ALL SOLDIERS ON THIS MISSION DURING AND AFTER THE WELL PLANNED COMPLEX ATTACK, WITHOUT A DOUBT THIS COULD EASILY HAVE BEEN MORE DISASTROUS ENDING. ALL GUN TRUCKS AND LINE HAUL DRIVERS EXECUTED ABOVE BEYOND THE SCOPE OF ANY TRAINING THEY HAD EVER RECEIVED. PEDAL TO THE METAL, GET OUT OF THE KILL ZONE. THE TWO MAIN FACTORS HERE WERE OUR SPEED AND INTERVALS.//NOTHING Follows // // // // // // //

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

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SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

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| LOCATION LSA Anaconda Balad, Iraq | DATE 20051028 | TIME 0900 | FILE NUMBER |
| LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME Heuer, David J. | SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER | | GRADE/STATUS E-8/ISG |
| ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS 729th Transportation Company LSA Anconda, Iraq, APO AE 09391 | | | |

I, David J Heuer, WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

On the morning of the 26 Oct 05 the rally time was 0730 at the 1173rd motorpool. The C2 conducted his convoy brief and rehearsals, we departed the motorpool to the north ECP and made our SP time at 0920. We turned onto ASR Dover in routenroute to ASR Cheyenne. We turned onto Cheyenne, and got north of FOB Spartan when we stopped to secure our loads that had shifted while we were traveling down Dover, we were halted for approx. 5 to 10 min before we returned to our trucks and headed on down the road. As we were traveling north we came up to what looked like a VBIED and a IP truck that was riddled with bullet holes that was just south of a little town. As we came up to the town the C2 said over the radio that we were going to slow down and decrease our intervals before we got to the town. As the lead gun truck passed thought the town he increased his speed. As we left the town I noticed that the vehicle in front of me (MSG Souza) was pulling away from me I then increased my speed to as fast as my truck would go which is 56 MPH We weren't but a couple of miles out of the town when I noticed the first IED go off. The call came out over the radio that it went off between Gun 1 and the lead bobtail. At this point I looked to my left and to the right and noticed that we were taking small arms fire from the left because I could see the round kicking up dust on the right. I was approx 300 to 350 meters from the original blast when it went off. I proceeded rolling when I heard and saw another blast from a IED I heard over the radio that another IED went off and that it did not hit anyone and that everyone was still rolling. I noticed that the second IED was somewhere around the 3rd or forth vehicle. I am at this point still looking around to see where the small arms fire was coming from when I say 2 or 3 insurgents behind the berm that was about 20 to 30 meters off of the road to the left. I turned to Cpt Peterson that was riding with me and said that I cold see them behind the berm when I heard another IED go off when I turned around to get my bearings back on the road I noticed that I had taken some smallarms to my hood because I could see the fiberglass on my hood was damaged. While I was heading through the "kill zone" I heard small arms fire and the pinging of rounds hitting off the armor. As I reached the site of where all the IED's had went off it got black and smoky and I had a hard time seeing where I was going so I told CPT Peterson to hold on because didn't know if I was going to hit the IED holes. I navigated my way through the dust and smoke and cleared it I smelt antifreeze so I call MSG Souza and asked him if he was OK and if he had taken any rounds to the radiator because I would now see antifreeze on my windshield and still smell it. I told him that I had to get moving because I didn't know how far I could go with my truck disabled. While all this was going on there was all kind of chatter on the radio about people taking small arms and that one trailer had taken a RPG and that his trailer was on fire. I was also hearing that people where clearing the killzone one at a time. We traveled about 3 1/2 to 4 miles when I heard the C2 say that we had to stop that he had casualties in his vehicle. Gun 1 then stopped at this time Gun 3 stopped where he was creating about a mile gap. As we stopped the element stopped in a line formation CPT Peterson and myself did a 5- 25 sweep and got out to access the damages. Gun 2 who followed us through the kill zone and was with the front element until the C2 called for them to come back to there element because there front door was not secure. Gun then turned around to access the rear element. The front did a battle assessment we had TRK 119 with 2 flat tires on the same axle, and one trk that was hit by a RPG that was on fire, soldiers grabbed fire extinguishers to put the fire out. When we found out that there was casualties MSG Souza and myself decided that we should box up so we jumped into our trucks and positioned ourselves in a box formation with 8 tasked vehicle and 1 gun trk. Once we were in the box SSG Stracke and SPC Magdaleno who have M249's positioned themselves in the rear of the box to protect to protect us because our rear was open due to the fact that Gun 2 turned around. Once in the box were again did a battle assessment the trailer fire wasn't put out so they grabbed some more fire extinguishers to put the fire out. While they were doing that MSG Souza, SPC Landeros, SGT Raborn, SGT Siciaros, and myself began changing the set of duals that was flat. All other drivers got out of there vehicles to preform security. It took us about 15 to 20 min to complete that and through the wood off the trailer that was burning. I than called SSG Pongratz and told him that we were green in the front element he acknowledged back with " Roger on the green In front." As we were waiting we were receiving MTS messages from Company and the rear element on there status and the status and names of casualties. Once we found out the names of the wounded and the KIA we relayed it to the rest of the front element. We were waiting for to see air support but it never came so we started telling SPC Turner who was riding with MSG Souza to MTS Company and Battlion to see what they could do to get us some. It was about 25 to 30 min after we boxed when we noticed that the Dustoff was leaving from the rear element. As we were waiting the soldiers were still pulling security we had a couple instances where we used the EOF procedures but did not have to fire any rounds. It seemed like forever but it was only about 3 to 3 1/2 hours for air support to reach us, it was to F-15 that were flying above us, about 30 min later 2 Kauai helicopters were pulling air security, it was a great since of relief to see them there by now we had been there for about 4 hours. The whole time we were out there we had communication with the rear element by radio or lcom and they were keeping us abreast of what was going on in the rear. Once the rear element was

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| EXHIBIT | INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT | PAGE 1 OF <u>2</u> PAGES |
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____ CONTINUED."
 THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT AND BE INITIALED AS "PAGE _____ OF _____ PAGES." WHEN ADDITIONAL PAGES ARE UTILIZED, THE BACK OF PAGE 1 WILL BE LINED OUT, AND THE STATEMENT WILL BE CONCLUDED ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF ANOTHER COPY OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT (Continued)

the ACC who had taken control of the convoy due to the injury the C2 sustained, instructed Gun 4 to come up to the front element to pull rear security. Shortly after that QRF arrived to the rear element and instructed the front element to turn around so that it would be easier for them to pull security for us. SGT Baumgartner the ACC this whole time was trying to collect information on what recovery assets were going to be need for LSAA and for the QRF so that they had enough recovery to get us back to FOB Spartan. When QRF arrived we finally found out what took them so long to get to us ,it was that they had to wait for EOD to arrive to clear a Daisy Chain of IED's that we past through. Once both elements were together Maj. Mathews form the 795 MP's took control turned the rear element around and staged us for the movement back to FOB Spartan. But before we could move we had to change a tire on Gun 5 and hook Gun 1 up to Gun 5 seeing that Gun 1 took rounds to the radiator and was overheating. When the tasks were complete Maj. Mathews escorted us back through the killzone which was now filled with civilian traffic. He lead us back to FOB Spartan where they had food, lodging, and a chaplain waiting for us as we arrived there.

In conclusion I would like to say that Sgt Baumgartner(ACC), SSG Mulkahy(C2),and SSG Froncak the LCC did a outstanding job and should be commended for there dedication to mission, there Soldiers and are credit to there Units and the United States Army.

////////////////////////////////////// NOTHING FOLLOWS //

AFFIDAVIT

I, David J. Heuer, HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

David J. Heuer
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 29 day of OCT, 19 05 at 729 TC Motor Pool

Key
729 TRANSPORTATION COMPANY
LSA ANACONDA BALAD, IRAQ APO AE 09391
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Patrick McNamarra
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

729 TRANSPORTATION COMPANY
LSA ANACONDA BALAD, IRAQ APO AE 09391
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

CPT PATRICK McNAMARRA
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)